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We provide new evidence on the the cyclical behavior of household size in the United States from
1979 to 2010. During economic downturns, people live in larger households. This is mostly, but not
entirely, driven by young people moving into or delaying departure from the parental home. We assess
the importance of these cyclical movements for aggregate labor supply by building a model of endogenous
household formation within a real business cycle structure. We use the model to measure how much
more volatile are hours due to two mechanisms: (i) the presence of a large group of mostly young
individuals with non-traditional living arrangements; and (ii) the possibility for these individuals to
change their living situation in response to aggregate conditions.  Our exercise assumes that older
people living in stable households have a Frisch elasticity that is consistent with the micro evidence
that is based on such people. The inclusion of people living in unstable households yields an implied
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Macroeconomists often argue that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is larger than what mi-
croeconomists have measured (see Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011a) and Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2011) for recent discussions). While microeconomists’ arguments are based on
measurements of this elasticity using data on the labor supply choices of actual people, the
rationale for macroeconomists preferring a larger elasticity is less clear. Macroeconomists’
arguments are implicitly based on the desire to account for aggregate movements in hours
worked through movements in prices. A more explicit, or empirical, argument for preferring
a larger elasticity is based on criticisms about the way that microeconomists have performed
their measurements. These criticisms insist that the micro measurements miss margins that
are relevant for the behavior of an aggregate economy. Some of these criticisms (movements
in the extensive margin, existence of more volatile secondary earners in the family, explicit
consideration of lifetime labor supply) have been accounted for by microeconomists in recent
work and have contributed to increase the microeconomic assessment of the labor elastic-
ity. However, the gap between the two views remains large. Macroeconomists (e.g.,Prescott
(2006)) sometimes insist that the elasticity of the stand-in household can be larger than that
of any real household.
In this paper we provide a measurement of an aggregate, or macro, elasticity that is consistent
with micro estimates, yet yields a much higher value. The rationale is that because of the
nature of available micro data, micro estimates of the Frisch elasticity tend to be based
on the behavior of people who live in what we call stable households: people whose living
arrangements do not change much over time. In practice, this usually translates into a focus
on married people or people above a certain age. However, the labor force consists of many
other types of people who live in less stable households. Such people, including the young
and the single, frequently change whom they live with: sometimes alone, sometimes with a
partner, often with their parents. These movements are in part a response to changes in
individual and aggregate labor market conditions.
The ﬁrst contribution of our paper is to provide new evidence on aggregate business cycle
movements in the living arrangements and labor supply of these less stable individuals. Us-
ing quarterly data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we document large cyclical
ﬂuctuations in the average size of US households. During economic expansions households
shrink, while during recessions households expand. To quantify the overall importance of
2these movements, we construct a new series for aggregate hours per household and compare
it to traditional measures of hours per person. We ﬁnd that hours per person are around 15%
more volatile than hours per household, with the diﬀerence due to the variation in household
size. A substantial fraction of this variation is due to the part of the population that we term
unstable: people whose household structure is most likely to vary over the business cycle. We
identify groups of people that move in and out of households frequently, and use these to
partition the population into those that live in stable households and those that do not. Our
analysis considers three such groups: people under 30; people that have never been married;
and people that are both under 30 and have never been married. In addition to having a large
volatility in household size, we show that these people work more hours when living alone
than when living with other more stable people, and have a higher volatility of hours worked
no matter what type of households they live in.1
For at least two reasons, it is important to recognize that living arrangements change with
the business cycle, and to incorporate these movements into macro models. First, despite
labor market inputs being measured at the level of the individual, consumption is almost
always measured at the level of a household. This reﬂects the fact that for the majority of
the population, spending decisions are made in the context of shared living arrangements,
which in turn reﬂects the presence of economies of scale within households. Thus, for any
analysis of the welfare costs of business cycles (and the welfare implications of policies that
aﬀect the cycle), the distinction between individuals and households is potentially important.
This is true because, as we document, the relationship between persons and households itself
features signiﬁcant business cycle variation. Yet, there are almost no quantitative business
cycle models that make this distinction. Second, a growing literature has recognized that
the labor supply decisions of individuals also reﬂect the opportunities and preferences of the
people they live with. Hence, changes in living arrangements can be important for labor
market variables even at the individual level.
Our second contribution in this paper is to explicitly incorporate the behavior of individuals
with ﬂexible living arrangements into the calculation of a macro labor elasticity. To do this,
we build and calibrate a real business cycle model with stable and unstable people (which we
also refer to as old and young, respectively), where the unstable optimally choose whether to
move and live with a stable person or to live alone. We restrict stable people to have the labor
1We deﬁne an unstable person to be living alone if they do not live in the household of a corresponding
stable person. For example, this means that a young person living with other young people as roommates is
considered as living alone.
3elasticity measured by microeconomists. We then examine the volatility of total hours in the
model and recover the implicit labor elasticity that a standard representative agent model
with only stable people would need, in order to replicate this volatility of hours worked. We
ﬁnd that the required Frisch elasticity of the stand-in household is around 40%   50% higher
than the micro estimates.
The most important feature of our calibration procedure is that we not only target the relevant
ﬁrst moments of the economy, but we also target the hours volatility of the unstable living
alone, the hours volatility of the unstable living in stable households, and the volatility of the
fraction of unstable people living alone, all relative to the volatility of the hours worked by stable
households. It is crucial to understand the importance of targeting these volatilities relative
to the hours volatility of the stable group, rather than targeting their absolute magnitudes.
The reason is that we do not want to allow total factor productivity (TFP) shocks, which are
the source of ﬂuctuations in our model, to account for any more of the variance of hours of the
unstable than they do for the hours of the stable. In our calibrated model, the fraction of the
variance of total hours accounted for by TFP shocks is equal for (i) hours worked by stable
households, (ii) hours worked by unstable people living alone, (iii) hours worked by unstable
people living together with stable people, and (iv) the fraction of unstable people living in
stable households. By calibrating the model in this way, we ensure that the volatility of total
hours is not larger than in standard representative agent models, purely because of a large
volatility of hours of the unstable.
In our model, there are three reasons why the volatility of hours worked is higher than in a
representative agent economy with the same Frisch elasticity for stable people. First, as in the
data, unstable individuals have a higher volatility of hours than stable individuals, regardless
of whether they live in stable or unstable households. Second, the existence of a second group
of workers with higher hours volatility generates movements in the relative prices of capital
and labor in equilibrium - wages are less volatile and rates of return are more volatile. These
price movements induce stable individuals to have a higher volatility of hours than what they
would have in the representative agent world because their hours respond more to increases
in interest rates than to reductions in wages. Third, during expansions, the unstable tend
to move out of stable people’s households into their own households (or together with other
unstable people, which we consider as living alone). Since they work more hours when living
alone, this increases aggregate hours volatility.
Clark and Summers (1981) ﬁrst noted that labor volatility is high for young workers. Kydland
4(1984), Ríos-Rull (1992), Ríos-Rull (1993), Ríos-Rull (1996), and Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert,
and Wright (2005) also documented diﬀerences in labor volatility by age or skill groups. They
posed models with age or skill variation to explore the business cycle implications of these
economies and the possible source of the variation in volatility. More recently, Jaimovich and
Siu (2009) exploited the higher volatility of the young to argue that the Great Moderation
(the reduction in economic volatility between 1984 and 2007) was due in part (between one-
ﬁfth and one-third) to demographic change that reduced the share of young people in the G7
economies. These papers, and, to our knowledge, all existing studies of the business cycle,
assume that household size is constant.2
Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2009) explore the role of imperfect substitution in production
between young and old workers to account for the higher volatility of the young. They
cleverly argue that the relative volatility of wages between young and old workers points to
an explanation based on diﬀerences in technology rather than preferences. In our paper, the
focus is not on explaining the labor market volatility of young workers, but on the interaction
between their living arrangements and hours ﬂuctuations. Despite the arguments in Jaimovich,
Pruitt, and Siu (2009), we choose to generate age diﬀerences in hours volatility through
diﬀerences in preferences rather than technology. This choice is not crucial to our analysis,
yet we prefer it because had we used diﬀerences in technology, the speciﬁc cross derivatives
that would be required in the production function would exacerbate some of the price eﬀects
that we discuss in Section 6. We want to isolate what most researchers would consider the
eﬀects of coresidence within the standard model.
Kaplan (2010) also studies the relationship between the labor market and the tendency for
the young to move in with the old in response to labor market outcomes. He estimates a
dynamic game between youths and their parents to understand the structural microeconomic
relationship between changes in living arrangements and labor supply. In this paper we model
this interaction in a much simpler way, in order to be able to build a model that is amenable
to equilibrium business cycle analysis with aggregate technology shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents business cycle properties of household
composition and labor market variables. Section 3 deﬁnes the question that we address in our
quantitative exercise. Section 4 describes a model with two types of agents, old and young,
with the latter moving in and out of the formers’ households. Section 5 discusses how we
2There are, of course, many papers about household formation, outside of a business cycle context.
5calibrate the model, giving special attention to the issue of the relative variances of hours
of the old and the young. Our ﬁndings for the baseline economy are discussed in Section 6,
together with the properties of model economies with diﬀerent calibration strategies. Section 7
studies a representative agent representation of our model economies that provide what we
call the macro elasticity. Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we document several new facts about changes in household composition over
the business cycle. We provide evidence to support the following facts:
1. There are large ﬂuctuations in average household size over the business cycle: during
economic downturns, people live in large households. A substantial part of these ﬂuctu-
ations are due to young or unmarried individuals moving in and out of the households
of older and married individuals.
2. Household formation oﬀsets a substantial fraction of the volatility in individual hours
over the business cycle: the cyclical variance of hours per household is around 15% lower
than corresponding variance of hours per person.
3. Those individuals who are most likely to change households are the same individuals
with the most volatile labor market outcomes over the business cycle.
2.1 Data
Data source Our primary source of data is the Basic Monthly Surveys from the Current
Population Survey (CPS). Because it contains data on labor market outcomes of all individuals
in a given household, the CPS is an ideal data set for measuring aggregate movements in
household composition at business cycle frequencies. We have monthly data on a large cross
section of individuals from 1979 to 2010, which we use to construct deseasonalized quarterly
series from 1979:Q1 to 2010:Q3.
Household deﬁnition Our deﬁnition of a household mirrors that of the CPS: all persons
who occupy a dwelling unit. A dwelling unit is deﬁned as a room or group of rooms intended
for occupation as separate living quarters and having either a separate entrance or complete
6cooking facilities for the exclusive use of occupants. We choose this deﬁnition both because
it is simple to compute given the available data, and because to a large extent it coincides
with the notion of a household from the point of view of economic theory. In our model, the
deﬁning feature of a household is that it contains a set of people who beneﬁt from economies
of scale in consumption.
Measurement issues The beneﬁts of the monthly CPS are its large size and high frequency,
while its main drawback is that it is cross-sectional data. This means that we cannot discuss
a notion of who moves in with whom when household composition changes. We can only
observe the other people that an individual is living with, not the physical structure that he
or she is living in. To know who physically does the moving, we would need panel data.
Although measuring household composition is essentially an exercise in counting numbers
of people and numbers of households that satisfy various criteria, some complications arise.
First, there have been signiﬁcant low-frequency secular trends in the age and demographic
structure of the population over the period that the data covers. In particular, the aging of the
baby boomer generation has led to a systematic change in household composition and average
household size because of life cycle eﬀects in living arrangements. We detrend our data series
using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. This eﬀectively removes the systematic changes induced
by changes in the demographic structure of the population.
Second, the sampling structure of the CPS complicates matters. The CPS is a non-random
sample of dwellings. In each sampled dwelling, information is gathered about all people who
currently reside there. This generates a non-random sample of individuals. One of these
individuals is labeled as the household head. In order to calculate statistics that are repre-
sentative of the US population as a whole, the CPS constructs weights based on observable
features of individuals (non-interview status, age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin). Households
are counted by constructing weighted counts of household heads, while individuals are counted
by constructing weighted counts of all household members. Weights are calculated using data
from the decennial census and are updated between census dates using population projections.
This updating of census weights can sometimes lead to discrete jumps in the relative counts
of people of diﬀerent types. Since there are systematic diﬀerences in the average household
structure of individuals with diﬀerent characteristics, such changes in the weights may lead to
discrete changes in our measures of household structure. The most important of these changes
occurred with the updating of the weights in January 1991. To deal with the updating in the
7CPS weights, we allow for a structural break by ﬁltering the data separately before and after
1990.
2.2 Cyclicality in Household Composition
Household Size in Adult Population We start by examining average household size in
the population aged 18 and over. Average household size is deﬁned as the total number of
households divided by the total number of persons in this age range. The solid blue line in
Figure 1a plots the raw time series for household size. On the same plot, the dashed red line
shows average hours worked per person aged 18 and over, as a measure of aggregate conditions.
The plots show a clear negative correlation between the two series. Overall, this correlation
is  0:75. The correlation between household size and hours is exacerbated at business cycle
frequencies: there is a sharp increase in the number of people per household in the 1981 and
2008 recessions, and a smaller increase in the milder recessions of 1990 and 2001. In Figure 1b
we plot the corresponding HP-ﬁltered series. The plot shows a signiﬁcant negative correlation
that is also exacerbated during the two large recessions ( 0:33).
To put the size of these changes in household size into perspective, during the most recent
recession, the seasonally adjusted number of persons per household aged 18 and over increased
from 1.883 in 2007:Q3 to 1.925 in 2010:Q4. This 2.2% rise in persons per household corre-
sponds to roughly 2:5 million households taking in an extra person during this recession.3
This evidence thus suggests large aggregate movements in a variable that is assumed constant
in almost all existing studies of business cycles.
Household Size for Diﬀerent Subgroups In Figure 2 we plot average household size for
individuals in diﬀerent subgroups. We consider two alternative ways to divide the population.
First we compare young individuals to old individuals. The raw data in Figure 2a and the
ﬁltered data in Figure 2b both show that the household sizes of 18 to 30 year olds are more
cyclical than those of 31 to 65 year olds, although the older group still features substantial
variation in household size over the business cycle. We also compare never-married individuals
with those who have been married at least once. The plots show similar ﬁndings: never-
married individuals have more volatile and cyclical household sizes. It is well known in the
literature that these two groups (the young and the single) also have much higher than average
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1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
yq
Log Hours Per Person
Log Persons Per Household
(b) HP-ﬁltered series
Figure 1: Persons per household, hours per person
Notes: All people 18 years and over. Households with no people aged 18 years and over included. Quarterly
data, 1979:Q1-2010:Q3, authors’ calculations from Basic Monthly CPS. Deseasonalized. HP-ﬁltered before
and after 1990 separately with parameter 1600.
Table 1: Cyclical Volatility of Persons Per Household
 (log hh size)(%)  (log hours)(%) Ratio
18-65 0.36 1.42 0.25
18-30 0.52 2.01 0.26
31-65 0.28 1.23 0.23
Never married 0.60 2.06 0.29
Married 0.28 1.25 0.22
labor market volatility (Kydland (1984), Ríos-Rull (1996), Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and
Wright (2005), Jaimovich and Siu (2009)). This turns out to be a general feature of the data
on cyclicality in household size: those individuals with more business cycle volatility in labor
market variables also have larger movements in household size over the business cycle. To
illustrate this point more concretely, Table 1 reports the standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered log
household size and log hours for all individuals aged 18 to 65 and for the two subgroupings
based on age and marital status.
Parental Coresidence Figure 3 shows evidence on the cyclicality of coresidence between
parents and children. We measure the parental coresidence rate for individuals aged 18 to 30
as the fraction of this age group whose relationship to the household head is that of a child.
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1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
yq
Age 18−30 Age 31−65
Never Married Married at Least Once
(b) HP-ﬁltered series
Figure 2: Household size by subgroup
Notes: All people aged 18-65. Household size reﬂects average number of people aged 18-65 living in same
household as individual in subgroup. Quarterly data, 1979:Q1-2010:Q3, authors’ calculations from Basic
Monthly CPS. Deseasonalized. HP-ﬁltered before and after 1990 separately with parameter 1600.
increase in parental coresidence around the 1981 and 2008 recessions. Figure 3b shows that
at business cycle frequencies there is again a strong negative correlation between the rate of
parental coresidence and hours worked by 18 to 30 year olds. One reason that it is informative
to examine parental coresidence as opposed to household size more broadly is that whereas
in general we do not know who moves in with whom, changes in coresidence rates among 18
to 30 year olds are reasonably likely to have been driven by children moving in with parents,
rather than vice versa.
2.3 Labor Market Variables and Changes in Household Size
Hours Per Household Almost all analyses of business cycle ﬂuctuations in labor market
variables are based on individual-level data: either hours or employment per person. However,
for many economic questions the household is a more relevant unit of analysis, for two reasons.
First, consumption, and hence welfare, are both decided and measured at the household
level. Second, labor supply decisions are often jointly made within the household. To assess
the importance of distinguishing between labor market ﬂuctuations at the household and
individual levels, we begin by constructing series for employment and hours per household.
These series are also important in their own right, since they are useful for understanding the
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1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
yq
Log Hours Per Person, 18−30
Log Parental Coresidence Rate, 18−30
(b) HP-ﬁltered series
Figure 3: Parental coresidence, hours per person
Notes: All people aged 18-30. Quarterly data, 1979:Q1-2010:Q3, authors’ calculations from Basic Monthly
CPS. Deseasonalized. HP-ﬁltered before and after 1990 separately with parameter 1600.
labor market outcomes.4 Figure 4 plots the cyclical component of hours and employment per
person and per household from 1979 to 2010.
A Useful decomposition: hours per household vs. households per person To
quantify how important are changes in household size for oﬀsetting hours and employment
movements at business cycle frequencies, we consider the following decomposition. Let hours
be denoted by H; employed person by E, households by F, and persons by N. Then we can










This decomposition says that we can write hours per person as hours per household multiplied










4Mulligan and Rubinstein (2003), in an unpublished paper, document some statistics similar to ours.
However, there are some important diﬀerences: (i) their data do not cover the most recent recession; (ii) they
focus on annual data, so have only around 30 data points; and (c) they do not analyze these series for relevant
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Log Employment Per Person
Log Employment Per Household
(b) Employment
Figure 4: Household-level vs. individual-level HP-ﬁltered labor market variables
Notes: All people aged 18 and over. Quarterly data, 1979:Q1-2010:Q3, authors’ calculations from Basic
Monthly CPS. Deseasonalized. HP-Filtered before and after 1990 separately with parameter 1600.





























Table 2 reports the result of this decomposition for employment and hours, using HP-ﬁltered
data at annual and quarterly frequencies. The results suggest that between 13% and 19%
of ﬂuctuations in per person labor market variables over the business cycle are oﬀset at the
household level by endogenous changes in household structure. These ﬁndings imply that
the margin of endogenous household formation may be quantitatively important for under-
standing both labor market ﬂuctuations and how households respond to changes in aggregate
conditions. Table 2 also reports analogous calculations when the data are detrended using a
linear trend rather than an HP-ﬁlter. Detrending the data in this way yields an even larger
contribution of movements in the number of persons per household. Since the diﬀerence be-
tween the two methods of detrending is the eﬀect of medium-frequency secular changes due
to episodes such as the productivity slowdown during the 1990’s, these results imply that
the mechanisms we are highlighting in this paper may be important for understanding labor
movements over longer frequencies in addition to business cycles.
12Table 2: Decomposition of hours and employment per person
Quarterly Data Annual Data
HP-ﬁlter Linear trend HP-ﬁlter Linear trend

























Correlogram: Log Hours of Young vs Lags of Coresidence Rate
Correlogram: Log Hours of Old vs Lags of Coresidence Rate
Figure 5: Correlogram: Log hours of young and old vs. lags of coresidence rate
Notes: Quarterly data, 1979:Q1-2010:Q3, authors’ calculations from Basic Monthly CPS. Deseasonalized.
HP-ﬁltered before and after 1990 separately with parameter 1600. Deﬁnition of young and old is based on
calibration described in Section 5.
Cross-correlations Figure 5 illustrates the joint business cycle dynamics of living arrange-
ments and hours worked in the form of a cross-correlogram. We highlight the following two
features of this ﬁgure that motivate some of our modeling choices. First, note that the nega-
tive correlation is very long lived. Second, note that hours worked of both the young and the
old slightly lag the fraction of the young living with the old: the lowest value of the correlation
is one period behind.
3 The Question
Given the preceding empirical analysis, it is tempting to conclude that in a model with a
representative household, one should be concerned with the variance of hours per household
13rather than the variance of hours per person, and to stop there. However, we would like to
go further. Our goal is to jointly account for movements in hours and household size, and
to understand their implications for the aggregate, or macro, labor elasticity. Speciﬁcally, we
take the following steps:
1. We build a model that is suitable for the study of business cycles (a stochastic growth
model with choice of hours), where there are two types of agents and a margin for
adjusting household composition. Unstable agents (whom we will interpret as young or
single) have the option to move in and out of the households of stable agents (which we
loosely interpret as the households formed by their relatives).
2. We map this model to data in order to ask how large are the ﬂuctuations in total
hours induced by productivity shocks when agents satisfy their intratemporal ﬁrst-order
condition for labor supply. To do this, we impose that the ratio of the variance of hours
of the old workers in the model to that in the data is the same as the ratio of the variance
of hours of the young workers in the model to that in the data, and is also the same as
the ratio of the variance of household size in the model to that in the data. By matching
relative variances in this way, we ensure that we do not impute to productivity shocks
a larger role in shaping household size and hours of the young than is imputed to hours
of the old.
3. We use the model to compute the macro Frisch elasticity that is consistent with a micro
elasticity that is estimated from data that include only individuals in stable households.
In our baseline calibration we will take this Frisch elasticity to be 0:72, but our results
do not hinge on any particular value for this micro elasticity. We ask what elasticity
does a standard representative agent model need in order to generate the same variance
of hours as in our model, when stable agents have a Frisch elasticity given by the micro
estimate.
4. We decompose the diﬀerence between the micro elasticity and our implied macro elas-
ticity into three components: (i) the direct eﬀect of the presence of the highly volatile
unstable agents; (ii) endogenous movements in household composition through choices
made by the unstable agents; and (iii) the indirect eﬀect that arises because the unstable
agents aﬀect cyclical movements in relative prices.
144 Model
Demographics Our model is populated by two types of agents. We label one type as stable,
as a stand-in for old, independent, or married; and the other type as unstable, as a stand-in for
young, dependent, or unmarried. For consistency with our baseline calibration, we will refer
to the two types as old and young in our description of the model. The fundamental diﬀerence
between the two types of agents is that the old always live in their own stable households,
whereas the young live in unstable households in the sense that they sometimes join other
people to form multiperson households and sometimes they do not.
Old agents in our model, like the agents in standard models, have preferences over consumption
and leisure in the current and all future periods and, consequently, make savings and work
decisions. In addition, the old are associated to some young agents whose company they
enjoy, in a separable and unmodeled way, but over whom they have no altruistic feelings. In
this fashion, if a young agent chooses to join the old household, she is welcomed in, and she
shares part of the consumption of the old due to the presence of economies of scale within
the household. The arrival of the young occurs after the old have chosen how much to work
and save. We explicitly model the fact that the old and the young have diﬀerent amounts of
eﬃciency units of labor and that the young and the old have diﬀerent preferences over pairs
of consumption and leisure within the period. Further, for convenience, we assume that the
young are extremely impatient.
Young agents generally prefer to live alone, although the strength of this preference is a random
variable that varies from period to period: young agents receive an idiosyncratic draw of how
much they dislike to live with the old. In some circumstances (low wages, good draws), young
agents will choose to join an old household. In an ironic abuse of language, we assume that
both the young and the old never age.5 We build this structure on top of a standard growth
model that is suitable for quantitative macroeconomic analysis.
The old There is a measure  of old agents that live in stable households of size . Conse-
quently, there are

 of these households. They can be invaded by a young agent, but only after
having made their choice of consumption and hours worked. Consequently, old agents must
assess the probability that this happens. Let x denote the probability that (or fraction of)
5It is easy, but tedious, to show that this model is isomorphic to another model where agents do age and
the young inherit the assets of the old.
15young agents that choose to join an old household. Given the relative sizes of the population



































where the ﬁrst term alludes to being alone and the second term to having been invaded by
a young agent. Here oo indicates the economies of scale among the old: if co is spent by a
household of size , then co
oo is enjoyed on a per capita basis. Similarly, parameters f o;og
take into account the disutility on a per capita basis of having household members work a
total amount of ho hours per period. Notice that given the functional form, o is the Frisch
elasticity of labor. The additional parameter o reﬂects the strain imposed by the young. The
old discount the future at rate  and face the following period budget constraint:
c
o + a
0 = w h
o + (1 + r) a; (2)
where a are the assets held by the household, w and r are factor prices, and where we have
normalized the eﬃciency units of labor of the old to 1.
The young There is a measure 1    of young agents. These agents have preferences over
consumption, leisure, and the type of household they live in, but are completely impatient
(hand-to-mouth). Every period they draw an i.i.d. idiosyncratic shock,   F(;), to
the disutility of sharing a household with an old agent. They can join (invade) a stable
household after observing all relevant information within the period: the realization of , and
the aggregate state of the economy that determines prices and allows them to forecast the














Notice that while the utility of the old displays log consumption, the young agents have a
diﬀerent curvature. Since the young do not care about the future, log utility would result in
16constant hours, and a diﬀerent shape of the utility function is required so that hours of the
young vary over the cycle.


















   + [(1 + xSS)
2   1]: (4)
Here y reﬂects the economies of scale in the old household, or, in eﬀect, how much free
riding the young get from the old. Note that these economies of scale do not depend on the
consumption of the old directly. The reason is that consumption of the old lags the cycle, and
if it aﬀected the location decision directly, it would introduce dynamics on the behavior of the
fraction of the young living with the old at odds with the features of the data described by
Figure 5.
The ﬁnal term in the utility function reﬂects an externality in living arrangements. It requires
both an explanation and a justiﬁcation. xSS is the deviation of xt 1, the fraction of the young
living with the old in the previous period, from its steady-state value. When x is relatively
large, there are more young people living with old people, and the disutility from living with
one’s older relatives is smaller. We have in mind the idea that part of the disutility of living
with one’s parents is due to a social stigma against living with parents that is smaller when
there are more young people doing it. In the steady state this eﬀect is normalized to zero.
The externality, particularly in the lagged form that we postulate, plays an important role
in generating dynamics for living arrangements that are consistent with the cross correlation
between hours worked by the young and the fraction of the young living with the old reported
in Section 2.3. We discuss this issue further in Section 5.
The young living alone choose fcyA;hyAg while the young living together choose fcyT;hyTg.




yj; j 2 fA;Tg; (5)
where y < 1 is the eﬃciency units of the young relative to the old.
17Production This structure is integrated onto a standard growth model. There is an aggre-
gate production function
Y = z K
 N
1 ; (6)
and the resource constraint for the economy is
C + [K
0   (1   K)] = Y; (7)
where C is aggregate consumption, K is aggregate capital, Y is output, N is the aggregate
labor input (not total hours worked), and z is an AR(1) productivity shock.
Aggregation Despite the fact that our model features multiple types of agents and house-
holds, aggregation in this environment is relatively simple. There are three types of choices:
those made by the old, by the young alone, and by the young together (recall that the old
cannot make their choices contingent on whether a young agent is present). There are three
types of households: old households without young agents (a measure

   x(1   )), old
households with young agents (a measure x(1   ) of those), and young agents alone (with
measure (1   x)(1   )).6
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yA]; (10)
Capital is owned by the old, so wealth is equal to total capital: K = a

.
Equilibrium Our model is simple enough such that the objects required to deﬁne an equi-
librium are the same as in a standard representative agent model. The aggregate state of the
economy is s = fz;K;x g; where x  is the lagged value of the fraction of the young living
with the old that is a state variable due to the lagged externality, since these are suﬃcient
statistics for wealth and prices.
6The relative sizes of the young and the old as well as the nature of the process for  guarantee that there
are not more young agents moving in with the old than the number of old households.








; the threshold for staying at home
(s); the fraction of young that move in with the old x(s); and competitive factor prices
fr(s);z(s)g, such that
1. The young maximize given the choice of the old. This includes the choices of consump-
tion, hours worked when together, hours worked when alone, and household type.
2. The fraction of the young moving in with the old satisﬁes x(s) = F((s);), and the












3. The old maximize given the expected choices of the young, and when imposing the rep-
resentative agent condition, their choices yield fK0(s);co(s);ho(s)g.
5 Calibration
Our main question is to ask how volatile are movements in hours that are driven by TFP
shocks when it is recognized that people live in both stable and unstable households, and
those in unstable households work less, are less productive, and move into the households of
stable people in a countercyclical way.
One way to proceed would be to choose parameters so that the model generates the same
volatility of hours of the young people, and the same volatility of household size, as in the
data. We think that such a procedure would give a misleading answer because it would
implicitly assume that all movements in hours are due to TFP shocks, whereas only a small
fraction (around 5% in a typical representative agent RBC model) of the volatility of hours
of the old are due to TFP shocks. Instead we choose parameters so that shocks to TFP
account for the same fraction of the variances of all types of hours worked and the variance
of household size. Calibrating the model in this way requires that we target both ﬁrst and
19second moments simultaneously. This means that the solution to the full stochastic model is
required for calibration, rather than just its steady-state statistics.
5.1 Baseline calibration
Technology Technology is that of a standard RBC model: Cobb-Douglas in capital and
labor with a shock to TFP. As stated above, hours of the young (i) command a lower wage (are
less eﬃcient than) hours of the old and (ii) are more volatile than hours of the old. These two
facts imply that aggregate hours (the unweighted sum of all hours) are more volatile than the
labor input (hours weighted by their eﬃciency). In our model the Solow residual — deﬁned
as SRt = logYt logKt (1 )logHt — is not the same as the TFP shock. Consequently,
the parameters that govern the stochastic process for TFP must be determined simultaneously
with the other model parameters. This ensures that a univariate representation of the Solow
residual from our model displays an autocorrelation of .9553 and a standard deviation for
the innovation of .688%. The implied coeﬃcients for the productivity shock in the baseline
calibration are an autocorrelation of .9444 and a standard deviation of innovations of .621%.
Note that the total variance of the shock is smaller than that of the Solow residual. This is
because hours worked is more volatile than the labor input, since the latter weighs the hours
of the old more heavily, and these hours are less volatile than the hours of the young.
Table 3 shows the parameters and the targets that we use. The ﬁrst set of parameters (in black)
are those that can be set directly without solving the model. The second set of parameters
(in blue) require the calculation of the steady-state to set its value. In this sense, ﬁnding the
value requires solving a system of equations imposing the steady state targets. Finally, the
third set of parameters (in red) require that we solve the whole model, where the system of
equations includes second moments of time series.
Demographics In our baseline calibration we identify the unstable young as those aged
below 30, and the stable old as those aged 30 to 65. Unless stated otherwise, the calibration
and ﬁndings that we report in the main text refer to this deﬁnition.
Preferences of the old Table 4 displays the targets for the preferences of the old, under the
baseline deﬁnition described above. The fraction of old agents is 0:684, which is the average
fraction of people aged 18 to 65 that are 30 and above, over the sample period in our CPS
data. Most of these people are married, generating an average household size of 1:8. The
20Table 3: Technological Parameters and Targets
Parameter Description Target variable Target Parameter
Parameters that can be set without solving the model
 Capital Share Capital Share :67 :67
"y Lab eﬃciency of young Direct Measurement .57 .57
Parameters that require solving for the steady state
 Depreciation rate I=Y .24 .0263
Parameters that require solving the full stochastic equilibrium
 AR(1) prod shocks Autocorr AR(1) RA Solow Res* .9553 .9444
z St Dev productivity shocks St Dev AR(1) RA Solow Res* .688% .621%
* Unﬁltered series.
discount factor is 4% and is standard. Recall that the utility function of the old posed in
equation (1) was separable between consumption and hours, with log utility for consumption
and a constant Frisch elasticity for labor. Because of the presence of log utility, equilibrium
allocations are not aﬀected by the actual parameter values for economies of scale among the
old. We report the OECD values for completeness.
For the Frisch elasticity of the old, we use a value that attempts to take into account both the
extensive margin and the typical existence of a couple in an old household. Our baseline value
of 0:72 is computed based on Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010). This number is
very close to the value obtained by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011a) of 0:82 in their
meta-analysis of estimates for the Frisch elasticity using micro data. We also note that with
one possible exception (the 1987 Iceland zero tax year studied by Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and
Zoega (2001)), none of the studies analyzed by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011a) or
Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011b) are based on data that include the type of unstable
marginal workers that we are emphasizing in this paper. We also perform a sensitivity analysis
on the assumed Frisch elasticity of the old using values in f0:55;1:0g. For the disutility of
work, we target a value of :5032 for mean hours worked, since this is the fraction of one adult’s
time endowment that is worked by the 1:8 adults in an old household.
21Table 4: Parameters of preferences of the old
Parameter Description Target variable Target Parameter
Parameters that can be set without solving the model
 Fraction of old Measurement 0.684 0.684
 Old household size Direct Measurement 1.798 1.798
 Discount rate Interest rate 0.04 0.9902
oo Ec of scale for old OECD 1.7 1.7
o Additional Ec of scale OECD 0.5 0.5
o Frish elast of old Measurement 0.72 0.72
Parameters that require solving for the steady state
 o Weight of hours of old Hours in Old Hholds 0.5032 4.4223
Preferences of the young Table 5 displays the targets of the parameters concerning the
young agents in the baseline economy. We target the following ﬁrst moment statistics of the
young: (i) hours worked if alone, (ii) hours worked if living with the old, and (iii) fraction of
the young that live with the old.
We also target the following second moment statistics: (i) variance of hours worked if alone,
(ii) variance of hours worked if living with the old, and (iii) variance of the fraction of the
young that live with the old, all relative to the variance of hours of the old. This ﬁnal target
ensures our model does not feature more movement along the coresidence margin than is
implied by the data. It is important to reiterate the fact that we target relative variances.
Our goal is to measure the contribution of productivity shocks to the variance of hours. Our
calibration strategy implies that the contribution of productivity shocks is the same for all of
the components that contribute to move total hours: the hours of the old, the hours of the
young living alone, the hours of the young living with the old, and the fraction of the young
living with the old.
Table 5 also displays the seven parameters involved in the calibration: three standard param-
eters of the utility function (risk aversion, weight on hours, labor elasticity); two parameters
governing the distribution of distaste for living with the old; one parameter for the economies
of scale when living with the old; and one parameter governing the externality in living ar-
22Table 5: Parameters of preferences of the young
Parameter Description Target variable Target Parameter
All Parameters require solving the full stochastic equilibrium
 y Weight of hours of Young Hours of young together 0.2105 6.1340
1 Shape par of Gamma dist % of young with old 50.23 0.7680
y Risk Aversion of young Hours of young alone 0.2972 0.2385
2 Scale par of Gamma dist V ar(x)=V ar(ho) 0.4582 3.2026
y Frisch elasticity of Young V ar(hyT)=V ar(ho) 4.0131 1.0459
y Ec of scale of Young V ar(hyA)=V ar(ho) 1.7774 1.5445
2 Curvature in externality Corr(x;h) -0.4774 4.4100
Variances are from logs and HP-ﬁltered.
rangements.7
The degree of risk aversion is particularly important. With log utility and no patience, hours
are constant, irrespective of the wage rate. When risk aversion is greater than unity, hours
move countercyclically, since the income eﬀect of wage changes dominates the substitution
eﬀect. This means that in our calibrated economy, the risk aversion of the young is less than
1.
It is crucial that we allow the idiosyncratic shocks for the distaste of living with the old to
be drawn from a ﬂexible two-parameter distribution. We choose a Gamma distribution. If
there were only one parameter, it would be pinned down by the mean fraction of the young
living with the old. However, what matters for our question is the slope of the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) at this value, since this is what determines the mass of young
agents that are induced to change their living arrangements in response to small changes in
the wage rate.
7 With the functional form that we have chosen all parameters aﬀect all choices and, as a result, the
calibration of the preference parameters of the young requires, that we solve for the stochastic equilibrium
even though some of the targets are ﬁrst moments.
235.2 Alternative calibrations
In addition to our baseline calibration, we also consider various other model economies with
slightly diﬀerent calibration strategies. The parameters associated with the calibration of
these alternative model economies can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix.
5.2.1 Alternative deﬁnitions of the young
In our baseline economy we identify the unstable young, somewhat arbitrarily, with individuals
between 18 and 30 years old. We also consider three alternative deﬁnitions of the young. The
ﬁrst two of these deﬁnitions are based on equally arbitrary notions of who is young/unstable:
(i) individuals who have never been married, and (ii) individuals who both have never been
married and are between 18 and 30 years old. The third alternative deﬁnition of the unstable
young is constructed not by choosing a particular demographic group, but by imposing that
the implied movements in households per person relative to the variance of total hours of the
old are the same in the model economy as in the data. The size of the young/unstable that
achieves this target is higher than in the baseline economy: 39% compared with 32%.
When the unstable young are deﬁned by explicitly targeting a particular demographic group,
it is possible to obtain direct measures of the volatility of hours of the young, both living
together and living alone, of hours of the old, and of the fraction of the young living with
the old, from the data. This is not the case for the third alternative deﬁnition of the young,
since the members of the group are deﬁned only implicitly. Given that we do not have
direct measures of the variances of the relevant variables, we cannot use them as targets for
calibration. Instead, we have used the relative variance targets from the baseline calibration
when calibrating the economy with the implicit deﬁnition of the young.
5.2.2 Alternative target for cyclicality of household size
In our baseline calibration we target V ar(x)=V ar(ho) as a way of ensuring that our model
features the correct degree of cyclicality in the living arrangements of the young. This choice
of target implicitly assumes that the fraction of the observed cyclical variation in hours of old
workers that is driven by TFP shocks is the same as the fraction of cyclical variation in the
proportion of the young living with the old that is driven by TFP shocks. However, this may
be overly conservative: it is feasible that TFP shocks account for a larger (or smaller) fraction
24of movements in household size than they do for hours worked.
To address this possibility, we also consider an alternative calibration strategy where we target
directly the empirical counterpart of the counterfactual experiment that we are interested in:
shutting down the margin of movements in x over the business cycle. To do this we calculate
how much smaller the variance of hours of the young would be in the data if x were held
constant at its mean value but hyA and hyT retained their empirical properties. Explicitly, we
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M compares the volatility of hours of the young with the volatility of a counterfactual series
for hours that holds x ﬁxed at its steady-state value. It thus provides a direct measurement
of how much movement there is in x over the business cycle: the target value is 0:11. In
this calibration we substitute only one calibration target, yet all nine parameters in Table 5
change, as well as the two parameters that determine the productivity shock process.
5.2.3 Economies without the externality
Our baseline economy includes a highly unusual, and perhaps controversial, feature: an ex-
ternality in the utility cost for the young to live with the old. So that we can explain why
it is important to include such an externality in the baseline model, we also consider two
versions of the model without the externality, in which we drop the ﬁnal term in (4). Since
there is one less parameter, in the ﬁrst alternative economy, we exclude one moment from the
set of calibration targets: the correlation between hours worked and coresidence. This is the
moment that pins down the extent of the externality in the baseline model. In the second
alternative economy we introduce an iid shock to the shape parameter of the Gamma distri-
bution, 1
t = 1 + t, where t  N(0;x). In this latter economy, we are able to target the
correlation between hours worked and coresidence by choosing the variance of the iid shock,
x. In Section 6.3 we discuss the implications of these alternative economies.
25Table 6: Second Moments of the Data, Standard Representative Agent and Baseline Economy
Data Representative Agent Baseline
Value % Accounted for Value % Accounted for
var(h) 2.03 .0908 4.5% .1547 7.6%
var(hy) 4.16 .3121 7.5%
var(ho) 1.52 .1100 7.2%
var(hyA) 2.70 .1956 7.2%
var(hyT) 6.10 .4416 7.2%
var(x) 0.70 .0504 7.2%
cor(x;h) -0.48 -.4774 100%
var(SR) 3.19 3.19 100% 3.19 100%
autcor(SR) 0.94 0.94 100% 0.94 100%
Contribution of households per person + covariance
15.2% 0.0% 13.3% 87.2%
6 Findings
6.1 The cyclical volatility of hours worked
Table 6 displays our main ﬁndings with respect to the cyclicality of hours worked. The ﬁrst
column shows the relevant second moments of the data, starting with the cyclical volatility
of total hours. The remaining moments are the variances of hours of the young, the old, the
young living alone, and the young living with the old, as well as the variance of the fraction
living alone. We also report the correlation between the fraction of the young living with the
old and total hours, and the moments of the Solow residual. As discussed in Section 2, the
old have a lower volatility than the young, and the volatility of the young is far higher when
they live inside an old household than when they live alone.
The second and third columns report the volatility of hours in a standard representative agent
real business cycle model with a Frisch elasticity of :72, and the ratio of the model variances
to the data. The volatility of hours in the standard model is very small: just 4:5% of that in
26the data.
The ﬁnal two columns report the analogous ﬁndings for the baseline economy. Recall that our
calibration strategy imposed that productivity shocks should account for the same fraction of
the total variance of all components of hours worked, which turns out to be 7.2%. However,
because in the model these components are all slightly more correlated than in the data, the
overall contribution of total hours is measured to be 7.6%. This is still very low by absolute
standards but is 70.3% larger than the representative agent model despite the fact that the
Frisch elasticity of the stable agents is the same in both economies (0.72).
The ﬁnal row of Table 6, displays the contribution of households per person to the variance
of hours worked (including the associated covariance) in the model and the data. The model
generates only 87% of this contribution that is in the data (13.3% vs. 15.2 %). This suggests
that for cyclical purposes, our deﬁnition of the young is too narrow, i.e., there is an insuﬃcient
role for variation in family size in the baseline model economy. We explore this issue in more
detail in Section 6.3.
6.2 Decomposition of hours volatility
There are three reasons why total hours are more volatile in our economy than in the represen-
tative agent economy: (i) the presence of young agents who are more volatile than old agents;
(ii) changes in relative prices that induce further changes in behavior; (iii) the ability and
willingness of the young to move in and out of households. We now decompose the diﬀerence
between our baseline economy and the representative agent economy into these three eﬀects.
To do this, we build up to the baseline model, starting from the standard representative agent
model, adding one element at a time.
(i) The young are more volatile than the old. The mere presence of the volatile young
in the model increases the variances of total hours. The young, whether living alone or living
together with the old, have more volatile hours than the old do. This, on its own, increases
total hours volatility. To quantify the eﬀect of this channel, we construct an economy with the
relative prices of the representative agent economy and adding two groups of young agents, a
constant fraction of whom live with the old, and the rest of whom live alone. In this economy
there are no movements in the coresidence margin. This allows us to isolate the eﬀect of the
presence of the young.
27Table 7: Decomposition of hours volatility
Contribution Implied
var(h) % var(ho) var(hy) var(x) Frisch
Representative agent model .0908 .0908 .7200
+ Presence of the young .1362 71.0 .0908 .2956 .9519
+ Price changes .1499 21.5 .1087 .2878 1.0203
+ Movements in household size .1546 7.5 .1100 .3121 .0504 1.0441
The second row of Table 7 reports the results. Adding young agents to the economy, some of
whom live with the old and some of whom live alone, increases the variance of total hours by
50% relative to the representative agent economy (0.1362 vs. 0.0908). This accounts for 71%
of the total increase in our baseline economy and turns out to be the most important margin
among the three channels.
(ii) Changes in relative prices. The third row in Table 7 reports the results in which
prices are allowed to adjust endogenously, in addition to the presence of the two groups of the
young, a constant fraction that lives alone and the rest that live with older households. In this
economy, prices adjust endogenously. The variance of total hours is increased by a further
15.1% (0.1499 vs 0.908), which reﬂects 22.7% of an increase relative to the representative
agent economy.
The source of this increase in hours volatility is particularly informative. The increase from
this channel is due to an increase in the hours volatility of the old. This is oﬀset by a decrease
in the hours volatility of the young living at home and of the young living alone. The presence
of the young whose hours volatility is higher than that of the old aﬀects relative prices in a
speciﬁc way: they dampen movements (variance) in wages (.484 vs. .497), but exacerbate
those of the rate of return that becomes more volatile (15.46 vs. 13.87). The old, because
they have intertemporal concerns, respond more to changes in the rate of return than to
changes in wages. Hence, their hours are more volatile in the baseline economy than in the
representative agent economy. The young, on the other hand, do not have any intertemporal
concerns. Hence, they are unaﬀected by changes in the rate of return and only respond to
wages. But since wages are less volatile in the baseline economy, so too are the hours of the
young. This channel accounts for 21.5% of the increase in the variance of hours.
28(iii) Movements in and out of households: The coresidence channel. In addition
to the presence of the young, movements in the fraction of the young living with the old over
the business cycle aﬀect the variance of total hours. During bad times, more young agents
move in with old agents. This reduces the average hours of the young in bad times, since they
work less while living with the old, which increases the variance of total hours.
To isolate the eﬀect of this channel, we compare the previous economy reported in the third
row of Table 7 with the properties of the baseline economy reported in the last row of Table 7
results. The eﬀect of allowing for movements of people across households is to increase the
variance of hours by a further 5.2%, relative to the representative agent model (0.1546 vs.
0.0908). This increase reﬂects 7.5% of the total increase in our baseline economy. We can
further decompose the 7.5% contribution of the corresidence channel into the direct eﬀect that
results from allowing the corresidence channel using the prices of the previous economy where
there was no coresidence channel (6.4% out of 7.5%) and the indirect eﬀect induced by the
further change in prices motivated by the coresidence channel (1.1% of the 7.5%).
6.3 Findings from alternative calibrations
Alternative deﬁnitions of the young Recall that we also consider three alternative deﬁ-
nitions for the young agents in our economy: (i) never-married individuals; (ii) never-married
individuals under 30; and (iii) an implicit deﬁnition that calibrates the fraction of the young
so that the ratio of the variation of households per person plus associated covariance terms to
the variance of hours worked is the same in the model and the data.
The ﬁndings are reported in Table 8. Unsurprisingly, the volatility of hours is slightly smaller
for the narrow deﬁnitions of the young. Interestingly, for the narrowest deﬁnition (never-
married individuals under 30) we see that the variance of the hours of the young is the largest
of all the groups (recall that we target the relative variance of the hours of that particular
group), but the size of the group is too small for this to have a large impact on the volatility
of total hours worked. Overall, our basic ﬁndings are not aﬀected by deﬁning the young as
diﬀerent explicit demographic groups: we ﬁnd a 54% (42%) increase in total hours volatility
when the young are deﬁned as never-married individuals (never-married individuals under 30),
compared with an increase of 70% in our baseline calibration, where the young are deﬁned as
individuals under 30.
The economy with an implicit deﬁnition of the young, calibrated so that the contribution of
29Table 8: Second Moments of Main Variables for Alternative Calibrations
Contr of HH
var(h) var(ho) var(hy) var(x) per pers + cov cor(x;h)
Representative agent model .0908 .0908 - - - -
Baseline economy .1547 .1100 .3121 .0504 13.3 -.48
Alternative deﬁnitions of young
Never married .1399 .1056 .3054 .0426 7.3 -.33
Never married, 18-30 .1290 .1007 .3613 .0270 7.2 -.37
Implicit deﬁnition .1776 .1168 .3302 .0535 15.2 -.48
Alternative calibrations
Target for var(x) (M) .1567 .1104 .3228 .0937 16.5 -.48
Economy without externality .1587 .1096 .3274 .0502 30.0 -.99
No externality + 1 iid .1537 .1093 .3046 .0501 13.3 -.48
The implicit deﬁnition of the young is chosen so that the size of the young generates a contribution of the
variance of households per person to total hours volatility that is the same as in the data.The economy with
the alternative target for var(x) matches the contribution of the movements in household composition to the
volatility of young hours, rather than the relative variance of the fraction of the young living with the old.
See Section 5.2.2 for full details.
30changes in households per person to the variance of aggregate hours is the same in the data
(15:2%), generates a much larger volatility of hours, 0.178. One might argue that the correct
value for the fraction of young agents is somewhere between the values in the baseline economy
and this economy. The baseline economy generates too small a contribution of households per
person to the total variance of hours (13.3% vs. 15.2%). However, the economy with the
implicit deﬁnition of the young has more young agents, yet targets the relative volatility of a
smaller group that may be more volatile than the implicitly deﬁned group.
Alternative target for cyclicality of household size Table 8 also reports ﬁndings for
the economy that targets the M statistics deﬁned in Section 5.2.2. Recall that M measures the
contribution of the variation in the fraction of the young living with the old to the volatility
of hours of the young. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, this economy does not impose that
the contribution of TFP shocks to movements in household composition is the same as the
contribution of TFP shocks to movements in hours. Instead, it imposes that the fraction of
the hours volatility in the young that is accounted for by variation in coresidence is the same in
the model and the data. This economy yields a variance of hours (0.157) slightly higher than
in the baseline (.155), despite having a total contribution of the movements of households per
person to total hours (16.5%) that is larger than in the baseline (13.3%) and indeed that in
the data (15.2%). It does so by posing a much larger, almost double, variation of the fraction
of the young living alone. The reason why the economy with the implicit deﬁnition of the
young previous economy has a much larger total volatility of hours is that the implied size of
the young is larger than in the economy that targets M, even though in the latter the living
arrangements are more volatile.
Economies without externalities The ﬁrst of the two economies without the externality
in the disutility of living with the old generates a somewhat larger volatility of hours than in
the baseline economy (.159), despite the fact that it targets the same relative variances of all
variables as in the baseline. This is because without the externality, the correlation between
coresidence and hours is not included as a calibration target. As a a result, the economy
without the externality implies a correlation between the fraction of the young living with
the old and total hours that is far too strong (-.99), compared with the data (-.48). With
such strong comovement of living arrangements and hours, the contribution of movements in
households per person to the total variance of hours is 30%, which is twice the contribution
in the data. The reason that we include the externality in the baseline model is that it serves
31to lower this correlation to a level that is consistent with the data.
The second of the two economies without the externality is intended to illustrate that the
externality is not essential for generating the right correlation between coresidence and hours.
To do this, we add an iid shock to the shape parameter of Gamma distribution 1, and choose
its variance to target this correlation. This economy, shown in the ﬁnal row of Table 8 displays
very similar features to the baseline economy. The variance of total hours is .1537, and the
contribution of the variance of households per person to the total variance of hours is the
same as in the baseline. Thus, one may ask why we did not choose to use this economy as
our baseline? The answer is that this economy features two aggregate shocks, both of which
have an eﬀect on hours and coresidence movements, while the standard representative agent
model has only one shock. This would make it diﬃcult to understand whether the additional
hours volatility in the model with coresidence is due to the mechanisms described above, or
simply due to the presence of an additional aggregate shock.
7 Implications for the calibration of representative agent models
The aim of this paper is in part to show that the macro labor elasticity is indeed diﬀerent
from the micro elasticity, while remaining scrupulously respectful of measurements of the
micro elasticity that are based on direct empirical evidence. Consequently, we now ask the
question of how much higher is the macro elasticity when we are explicit about both the
existence of young people and the existence of movements in household size. To answer this
question, we calibrate a standard representative agent business cycle model by choosing the
Frisch elasticity so that the representative agent model generates the same volatility of total
hours as the model economies that we have studied in this paper.
Table 9 reports these ﬁndings. For our baseline deﬁnition of the young, we ﬁnd that the
implied macro Frisch elasticity is 1:04. Since the elasticity of the old in our baseline economy
was 0:72, our ﬁndings suggest an increase in the Frisch elasticity of around 45%. The highest
implied macro elasticity results when the economy is calibrated to replicate the movements in
household composition: 1.16, which reﬂects an increase of 61%. For the stricter deﬁnitions of
the young, this percentage increase is between 27% and 35%. In our alternative calibrations
that match the contribution of movements in household composition to the volatility of young
hours and in the economy with no externality, we get results that are very similar to the
baseline: a macro elasticity that is between 45% and 50% higher than the micro elasticity.
32Table 9: Macro elasticity comparable to a micro elasticity of 0.72
Implied Frisch Proportional
Economy in RA RBC Increase
Baseline economy 1.044 45%
Alternative deﬁnitions of young
Never married 0.971 35%
Never married, 18-30 0.916 27%
Implicit deﬁnition 1.158 61%
Alternative calibrations
Target for var(x) 1.054 46%
Economy without externality 1.064 48%
No externality + 1 iid 1.039 44%
The implicit deﬁnition of the young is chosen so that the size of the young generates a contribution of the
variance of households per person to total hours volatility that is the same as in the data. The economy with
the alternative target for var(x) matches the contribution of the movements in household composition to the
volatility in young hours, rather than the relative variance of the fraction of the young living with the old.
See Section 5.2.2 for full details.
33Table 10: Macro elasticity for alternative micro elasticities
Implied Frisch Proportional
Frisch elasticity for the stable: in RA RBC Increase
 = 0:72 (baseline) 1.0442 45%
 = 0:55 0.7691 40%
 = 1:0 1.5463 55%
Alternative assumptions for micro Frisch elasticity A concern that we have is whether
the increase in the Frisch elasticity when moving from a representative agent economy to an
economy with unstable agents is aﬀected by the level of the actual micro Frisch elasticity.8
The reason for this concern is the non-linearity of the underlying model. To explore this issue,
we replicated the analysis above for an economy where all the targets are the same as in the
baseline, except for the Frisch elasticity of the stable old agents. We consider values of .55
and 1.0. Table 10 reports the representative agent counterpart of our economies with young
agents. We ﬁnd that the level matters to some extent: the higher the initial value of the
Frisch elasticity, the higher the extra kick that results from explicitly modeling the unstable
young agents. While for the baseline choice of a Frisch elasticity equal to .72, we obtain an
increase of 45%, the implied increase when we start with a Frisch elasticity of 1.00 (0.55) is
55% (40%).
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the role of countercyclical movements in household size for
business cycles. We started by providing evidence on this often suspected, but not docu-
mented, feature of how people bear bad times. We ﬁnd that cyclical movements in household
size are large: changes in the average number of households per person account for 15% of
the cyclical variation in hours worked per person. A large part of these changes in household
composition is due to young, or unstable, individuals moving in and out of the homes of older,
8Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011a) and Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011b) conduct a
meta analysis of micro estimates of the Frisch elasticity. Of all the studies they examine, only one could be
argued to include the type of individuals with unstable living arrangements that we focus on in this paper: this
is the study of Iceland’s temporary tax holiday by Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega (2001). The remaining
studies should be interpreted as estimates of the Frisch elasticity for stable or old individuals.
34stable individuals.
We then posed a model with both stable and unstable individuals where household composition
is chosen optimally by the unstable agents in the model. Our model is embedded in a growth
model that is suitable for business cycle analysis. We used the model to reassess the importance
of TFP shocks for hours volatility.
Our ﬁndings for the volatility of hours can be summarized as follows. Although TFP shocks
in a baseline representative agent economy account for a very small fraction of the observed
volatility of hours, this fraction increases by around 70% when (i) the existence of young
people, some of whom live with the old, is taken into account; and (ii) it is recognized that
they move in and out of older households in a cyclical manner. We decomposed the reasons
for the increase in hours volatility. About 71% is due to the existence of young, unstable
agents with a high labor elasticity, 7.5% to movements in and out of households, and 21.5%
to changes in hours of the old that arise because of changes in relative prices induced by the
behavior of the young. Together, this increases what we call the macro elasticity by around
50% over the micro elasticity: when the Frisch elasticity for the stable, old individuals in our
model is 0.72, a representative agent model would require a Frisch elasticity of 1.04 to generate
the same total volatility of hours. Our ﬁndings are very robust to details of the calibration.
We conclude that macroeconomists now have a powerful argument to claim that the macro
labor elasticity is larger than that yielded by micro studies that are based on stable households.
Our work suggests that household composition choice should become a major part of the large
class of models in which agents are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks.
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